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BEING DEPRIVED OF THE RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE COUNSEL IN REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS: WHY THE EIGHTH




Mr. Utoc Garcia,1 a native and citizen of Guatemala, came to the
United States in 1992, fleeing the brutal civil war that had been rag-
ing in his country for several decades.2  He was from a minority ethnic
Mayan group heavily targeted by the Guatemalan government for its
suspected ties to the guerilla movement.3  In fact, reports have shown
that the Guatemalan government engaged in systematic human
rights violations to a degree approximating genocide in some loca-
tions.4  He fled Guatemala and sought refuge in the United States.
After his arrival, he immediately brought himself to the attention of
U.S. authorities by filing for asylum in 1992.
However, similar to many other Guatemalan asylum seekers, Mr.
Utoc was not given his first interview before the branch of the govern-
ment that adjudicates asylum applications until 2007, fifteen years
after having filed for asylum.5  The Asylum Corps was plagued with
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1. Although the facts of this case have been changed to preserve confidentiality,
the material aspects described are unchanged and representative of several clients I
have represented in Nebraska.
2. See generally COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION: GUATEMALA MEMORY
OF SILENCE: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994), available at http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/mi-
grate/uploads/mos_en.pdf [hereinafter GUATEMALA MEMORY OF SILENCE]; STEPHEN
SCHLESINGER, BITTER FRUIT: THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA (4th ed.
2001).
3. GUATEMALA MEMORY OF SILENCE, supra note 2.
4. Id. at 38-41.
5. See, e.g., Cuadra v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 947, 948 (8th Cir. 2005) (delaying an
asylum seeker’s initial interview by twelve years); Molina Jerez v. Holder, 625 F.3d
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backlogs during this time and devoted frightfully insufficient re-
sources to adjudicating these claims.6
When Mr. Utoc appeared for his asylum interview, the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) denied his re-
quest for asylum because the civil war in Guatemala had ended dur-
ing the fifteen-year period in which he waited to present his claim.7
Asylum law does not consider the fact that in the time he waited for
an interview, he purchased a home, started a business, and estab-
lished a family with minor children born in the United States who
knew nothing of Guatemala.  Notwithstanding these substantial ties
to the United States, USCIS placed Mr. Utoc in removal proceedings a
month later.8
Fearful of returning to a country he had not seen in a decade and
a half, Mr. Utoc sought the assistance of counsel.  However, as he
would later discover, he entered into an agreement with a group that
engages in the unauthorized practice of law.  Mr. Utoc paid this group,
located in rural Nebraska, $6,000 to represent him in his immigration
matter.  To Mr. Utoc, non-attorney Juan Valdez9 appeared to be the
primary person handling his case.  It was not until Mr. Utoc obtained
new counsel that he learned that Valdez was not actually an attorney.
Mr. Utoc was statutorily eligible to apply for cancellation of re-
moval for certain nonpermanent residents because he had resided in
the United States for more than ten years, had four United States-
citizen children, and had absolutely no criminal record.10  However,
he was never informed of the requirements to be granted this form of
relief.  In particular, Mr. Utoc was never informed that the most im-
portant requirement to prevail on such a claim is to establish that his
1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 2010) (failing to make a final asylum determination for nearly two
decades); see also Hernandez v. Napolitano, No. 8:13CV113, 2013 WL 6662861, *2-3 (D.
Neb. Dec. 17, 2013) (stating that the government “delayed implementation of the [ABC]
settlement for years, and what were once strong asylum claims became stale as condi-
tions improved in El Salvador and Guatemala”).
6. See Memorandum, Joseph E. Langlois, Asylum Division, Making ABC Regis-
tration Determinations, Chaly-Garcia v. U.S., 508 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2007) (Aug. 5,
2008), available at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/
Static_Files_Memoranda/Archives%201998-2008/2008/making_abc_registration_deter
minations_080508.pdf (developing procedure in 2008 to adjudicate hundreds of pending
ABC asylum applications filed in or before 1991).
7. Truth Commission: Guatemala, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (February
1, 1997), available at http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-guatemala.
8. See INS v. Lopez, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (stating that removal proceed-
ings, formally known as deportation proceedings, are civil proceedings to determine a
noncitizen’s eligibility to remain in the United States).
9. This is not the person’s real name.
10. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2014); In re Gon-
zalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 468 (B.I.A. 2002).
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United States-citizen children would suffer exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship if he were deported back to Guatemala.11
While waiting for his final hearing, set for July of 2010, Mr. Utoc
retrieved the documents Valdez instructed him to gather.  Addition-
ally, Mr. Utoc spoke with Valdez and informed him that his youngest
son, Edward, suffered from developmental delays, significant lan-
guage, learning, and psychological problems, and required speech
therapy, psychiatric counseling, and special education.  Mr. Utoc
asked Valdez if this information should be included in his case.
Valdez errantly told him that the information about his son’s disabili-
ties was not necessary to the case when in fact it likely would have
made the difference between winning and losing.12  Regretfully, Mr.
Utoc relied on this bad advice from Valdez and did not bring it up
again.
At the trial before the Omaha Immigration Court, an attorney
who worked with Valdez represented Mr. Utoc.  This attorney, Sue
Jones,13 had not been present at any of the meetings between Mr.
Utoc and Valdez, and as far as he could tell, Jones was completely
unprepared and knew nothing about his case.  Jones did not speak
Spanish and thus Mr. Utoc could not communicate with her.  None of
the information about Edward’s disabilities was introduced at trial or
considered by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ denied Mr. Utoc’s Applica-
tion for Cancellation of Removal under section 240A(b) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (“INA”) for the sole reason that he had
failed to meet his burden of establishing exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship.14  Mr. Utoc, through Jones, filed a timely appeal of
the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or
“Board”); however, neither Jones nor Valdez included any information
about Mr. Utoc’s disabled son.  Consequently, the Board denied the
appeal for the same reasons given by the IJ.
Mr. Utoc retained new counsel15 and discovered for the first time
that Valdez was not even an attorney.  He thus filed a complaint with
11. Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 468.
12. See, e.g., In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. &. N. Dec. 56, 63 (B.I.A. 2001) (noting
that a “strong applicant might have a qualifying child with very serious health issues,
or compelling special needs in school.”).
13. This is not the attorney’s real name.
14. The IJ stated that there were “plenty of favorable discretionary factors” in the
case.  However, because the “sole hardship factor presented” related to Mr. Utoc’s four-
teen year old daughter who suffered from mild asthma, the IJ found that “the record
[was] [in]sufficiently developed” to meet the hardship standard.  Had the far more seri-
ous proof of hardship to Mr. Utoc’s son been introduced, it is quite likely that Mr. Utoc’s
case would have been granted by the IJ.
15. The author of this Article.
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the Nebraska Commission on the Unauthorized Practice of Law
against Valdez.  Likewise, Mr. Utoc filed a bar complaint with the Ne-
braska Counsel for Discipline against Jones for failing to introduce
indispensable evidence relating to his son’s disability.  He also sought
to reopen proceedings before the Board based upon the ineffective as-
sistance of counsel he had received and the new evidence that had not
been reviewed by the Board.16
Mr. Utoc’s son, Edward, continued to suffer from his debilitating
mental disability and required special education, weekly therapy,
counseling, and psychiatric treatment.  Although Edward was six
years old, he remained largely unable to speak.
Edward’s treating physician, Dr. Hong, indicated that Edward
would not be able to receive the therapy he needed in Guatemala and
numerous country conditions reports established that there was virtu-
ally no treatment for similarly disabled individuals in Guatemala.17
16. See Ortiz-Puentes v. Holder, 662 F.3d 481, 485 n.2 (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining
that the appropriate remedy is to reopen proceedings when there is a “reasonable
probability that but for errors of counsel, the result in the case would have been
different”).
17. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, GUATE-
MALA: THE SITUATION FACING THE DISABLED, PARTICULARLY PERSONS WITH SPEECH AND
HEARING LOSS, (Jan. 25, 2000), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6b53
.html.  A United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) re-
port indicated that “[i]n general, the Guatemalan State does not provide services for the
disabled population [and] [a]s a result of this situation, it is common to witness persons
with hearing and speech loss, . . . begging for money on the streets . . . .” Id.  The report
also indicated that “the potential for employment for the disabled is extremely limited”
and those few jobs available for the disabled tend to be “at salaries below the estab-
lished minimum wage.” Id.  Likewise, the “few social services that do exist in Guate-
mala” are very difficult to access “for the deaf-mute population” living outside of the
capital. Id.  Similarly, the report found that Guatemalan “health care is precarious” and
that “even less can be expected for the special needs population.” Id.  In sum, because
“resources available for those with physical disabilities are extremely scarce,” most live
in “a state of dependency” leaving them “vulnerable to discrimination and exploitation.”
Id.  Another report found that “[m]ost children with disabilities in Guatemala do not
attend school [and] fewer than 2% of adults with disabilities are” employed. EMERGE
POVERTY FREE, Who is helping people with disabilities in Guatemala?, World Emergency
Relief, November 11, 2010, http://emergepovertyfree.org/who-is-helping-people-with-
disabilities-in-guatemala/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).  A similar report found that be-
cause of the “lack of coordination between education and health-care systems to work
with disabled children” in Guatemala, most “children with disabilities do not attend
formal education.” Jill Replogle, Guatemala’s disabled children face a lifetime of chal-
lenges, THE LANCET, Vol. 365, Issue 9473 (May 2005), at p. 1757.  In fact, one study
indicated that “86% of students with disabilities in Guatemala are” receiving no educa-
tion and “[t]here are virtually no special education programs.” Need, Transitions Foun-
dation of Guatemala, 2011.  Of the disabled students who do complete high school, “51%
are illiterate.” Id.  Indeed, the United States State Department’s own Human Rights
Report for Guatemala found that although the law states that persons with disabilities
should not face discrimination, disabled people do “not enjoy these rights, and the gov-
ernment devoted few resources to addressing the problem.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUN-
TRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: GUATEMALA (2011), available at http://
www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dlid=186518.  The report
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This evidence, along with proof regarding the ineffective assistance
that Mr. Utoc received, was filed in a Lozada motion to reopen before
the Board.18  However, because the case arose in the jurisdiction of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the Board
was required to apply the rule of that circuit.19  Despite the truly com-
pelling facts of this case, and Mr. Utoc’s compliance with the require-
ments of a Lozada motion, a single member of the Board denied Mr.
Utoc’s action.  Mr. Utoc appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, but settled his claim before a decision was rendered.
Although the facts of this case are unique, the situation for immi-
grants who have received frightfully defective assistance from their
attorneys, or non-attorneys masquerading as attorneys, is all too com-
mon.20  For the reasons discussed more fully below, immigrant victims
are at particular risk in tribunals beneath the Eighth Circuit because
of its aberrant precedent in the area of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel in immigration proceedings.21
In this Article, I will first provide an overview of the procedure for
making a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in removal pro-
ceedings and give a brief history of this procedure as used since the
Board’s seminal decision in Matter of Lozada.22  Second, I will discuss
the Eighth Circuit’s treatment of ineffective assistance of counsel in
removal proceedings and how it compares with its sister circuits.
Third, I will argue that the Eighth Circuit has erred in this area of the
law and should join the vast majority of other circuits in the country
by holding that there is a constitutional due process right to effective
counsel in immigration proceedings.  Finally, I will present a strategy
that a future Eighth Circuit panel could use to overrule its previous
decisions.
also found that “[t]here were minimal educational resources for persons with special
needs.” Id.
18. See Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 638 (B.I.A. 1988) (explaining the
administrative precedent relating to reopening a case to correct errors that result from
the ineffective assistance of counsel).
19. In re Hector Ponce de Leon, 21 I. & N. Dec. 154, 159 (B.I.A. 1996).
20. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, List of Currently Disciplined Practitioners, http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/list-of-currently-disciplined-practitioners, (last visited Jan. 5,
2015) (listing as of January 5, 2016, the 673 immigration practitioners who are sus-
pended or disbarred by the BIA); see generally Anne E. Langford, What’s in a Name?:
Notarios in the United States and the Exploitation of a Vulnerable Latino Immigrant
Population, 7 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 115 (2007).
21. See generally Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2008).
22. 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1996).
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MOTIONS TO REOPEN BASED
UPON THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
A. REQUIREMENTS FOR A MATTER OF LOZADA MOTION TO REOPEN
The Board in Matter of Lozada23 recognized the need for a proce-
dural mechanism to correct errors that resulted from counsel’s ineffec-
tive assistance.24  Although the underlying reasons for Lozada have
come under attack in several cases,25 its framework has been adopted
by every circuit in the country as controlling on motions to reopen
based upon ineffective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings.26
In order to comply with Lozada, a motion to reopen27 based upon
ineffective assistance of counsel must meet the following three
requirements:
[1] [It must be] supported by an affidavit of the allegedly ag-
grieved respondent attesting to the relevant facts[,] . . . [2]
[F]ormer counsel must be informed of the allegations and al-
lowed the opportunity to respond[, and] . . . [3] Finally, if it is
asserted that prior counsel’s handling of the case involved a
violation of ethical or legal responsibilities, the motion should
reflect whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate
disciplinary authorities regarding such representation, and if
not, why not.28
As to the first requirement, the Board has explained that the affidavit
should include a statement that sets forth in detail the agreement
that was entered into with former counsel with respect to the actions
to be taken and what counsel did or did not represent to the respon-
dent in this regard.29
23. 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1996).
24. Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988); see also Ochoa v.
Holder, 604 F.3d 546, 548 n.1 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating that the Eighth Circuit uses the
Board’s leading decision in Matter of Lozada as a “substantive and procedural compass”
in evaluating these claims).
25. See In re Compean (Compean I), 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 710 (Att’y Gen. 2009),
vacated by 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (Att’y Gen. 2009); Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861
(8th Cir. 2008) (holding that noncitizens in removal proceedings have no constitutional
right to effective counsel).
26. See infra note 109  and accompanying text; see also Ortiz-Puentes v. Holder,
662 F.3d 481, 485 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating, “When [a] motion [is] premised on claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, we use the Board’s leading decision in [Lozada] as a
‘substantive and procedural compass.’”).
27. Motions to reopen based upon other considerations are beyond the scope of this
Article.
28. Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639.
29. Id.; see also In re Bozena Zmjewska, 24 I. & N. Dec. 87, 94-95 (B.I.A. 2007)
(finding that the Lozada requirements may be likewise applied to non-attorney BIA
accredited representatives); Hernandez-Moran v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 496, 499 (8th Cir.
2005) (describing requirement for an affidavit detailing representation agreement).
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The second two requirements are important to protect against
meritless claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and they provide
more information to the tribunal to evaluate the motion.30
One foundation for the procedures Lozada adopted is the “fifth
amendment guarantee of due process.”31  The Board explained that
“[i]neffective assistance of counsel in a deportation proceeding is a de-
nial of due process” when it renders the “proceeding . . . so fundamen-
tally unfair that the alien [is] prevented from reasonably presenting
his case.”32  However, as discussed further below, this conclusion is
not universally accepted.
B. THE REQUIREMENT OF PREJUDICE
In addition to complying with the three procedural requirements
of Matter of Lozada33 discussed in the previous section, one must also
establish that such ineffective assistance resulted in prejudice.34  To
establish that former counsel’s deficient performance resulted in
prejudice, courts require the movant to make two showings:  First, it
must be shown that counsel failed to perform with sufficient compe-
tence.35  Second, it must be shown that the client was prejudiced by
his counsel’s performance.36  To do this, the noncitizen need only
“show that he has plausible grounds for relief.”37  That is, the evidence
submitted in a motion to reopen need not definitively prove eligibility
for relief.38
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
held that in order to establish “the requisite prejudice” for purposes of
a motion to reopen based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, a peti-
30. See In re Bassel Nabih Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec. 553, 556 (B.I.A. 2003) (explain-
ing that the policy reasons behind the complaint requirement is that it “increases our
confidence in the validity of the particular claim, reduces the likelihood that an eviden-
tiary hearing will be needed, and serves our long-term interests in monitoring the rep-
resentation of aliens by the immigration bar.”).
31. Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 638.
32. Id.
33. 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988).
34. Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988); Habchy v. Gonzales,
471 F.3d 858, 863-64 (8th Cir. 2006).
35. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2005).
36. Ortiz-Puentes v. Holder, 662 F.3d 481, 485 (8th Cir. 2011).
37. Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1027 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v.
Jimenez-Marmolejo, 104 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1996)).
38. See Fadiga v. Attorney Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 157-63 (3d Cir. 2004) (reversing the
BIA where the Board held that respondent had to prove a “clear probability” to reopen
his case); see also Maravilla-Maravilla v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 855, 858-59 (9th Cir. 2004)
(reversing the BIA denial of motion to reopen where the Board required Respondent
show he would win his case, rather than that his claim may have been affected by coun-
sel’s ineffective assistance).
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tioner must show that there is a “reasonable probability that but for
errors of counsel, the result in the case would have been different.”39
In other cases, the Eighth Circuit has explained “[a]ctual
prejudice exists where defects in the deportation proceedings may well
have resulted in a deportation that would not otherwise have oc-
curred.”40  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has defined “prejudice” as “an error that potentially . . . affects the
outcome of the proceedings . . . .”41
Other circuits have made clear that the prejudice requirement
does not mandate the movant to show that it is more likely than not
that he would prevail if his case were reopened, but simply that there
is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome would be different.42
In motions to reopen based upon new information, the Board has
recognized that the evidence submitted need not definitively prove eli-
gibility for relief; rather, it must only make out a prima facie case for
eligibility.43  In assessing whether a person has established prima fa-
cie eligibility in the asylum context, the Board has defined it as a “ ‘re-
alistic chance’ that [the applicant] will be able to establish
eligibility.”44
In sum, if a movant complies with the procedural requirements of
Lozada and establishes that the ineffective assistance of counsel re-
sulted in prejudice to his case, the proceedings should be reopened.45
39. See Ortiz-Puentes, 662 F.3d at 485 n.2 (citing Obleshchenko v. Ashcroft, 392
F.3d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 2004)).
40. Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 466 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v.
Torres-Sanchez, 68 F.3d 227, 230 (8th Cir. 1995)).
41. Al Khouri, 362 F.3d at 466 (quoting Agyman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 884 (9th Cir.
2002)); Perez-Lastor v. INS, 208 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2000); Ambati v. Reno, 233 F.3d
1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Kuciemba v. INS, 92 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1996)).
42. See Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 157-63; see also Maravilla-Maravilla, 381 F.3d at 858-
59.
43. See Matter of Coehlo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 472 (B.I.A. 1992) (explaining a mo-
tion to reopen might be denied based on a failure to establish the prima facie case to
reopen).  Prima facie means “on the first appearance but subject to further evidence or
information.” Prima facie, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
44. Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 252 (B.I.A. 2007) (citing Poradisova v.
Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 2005)).
45. The timing of a Lozada motion to reopen is another important consideration,
but is beyond the scope of this Article.  Additionally, while also beyond our scope here, it
should be noted that United States Courts of Appeals always have jurisdiction to review
the Board’s denial of a motion to reopen based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel.
The United States Supreme Court made that point clear during the last term.  In Mata
v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015), the Court, in an 8-1 decision, reversed the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals’ holding that it had no jurisdiction to review the Board’s denial of an
untimely motion to reopen removal proceedings based on a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.  The Court’s decision in Mata held that “[w]henever the Board denies
an alien’s statutory motion to reopen a removal case, [circuit] courts have jurisdiction to
review its decision.” Mata, 135 S. Ct. at 2155.  This decision implicitly overruled the
Eighth Circuit’s decisions in Nativi-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir.
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C. CRITICISM OF LOZADA
Since the Board’s decision in Matter of Lozada,46 every circuit
court in the country has adopted and used the case as a guidepost for
analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.47  However, the un-
derlying reasons for Lozada have been called into question by several
tribunals and the extent to which the decision rests on constitutional
footing has been the subject of some debate.
The most significant attack on Lozada and its progeny occurred in
the 2008 decision In re Compean (Compean I)48 when the Attorney
General of the United States (“AG”), Michael Mukasey, overruled
Lozada.49  In his decision, the AG threw out Lozada’s well-established
framework and laid in its place a structure designed to make this al-
ready difficult remedy even more unattainable for victims of unscru-
pulous attorneys.50
In overruling Lozada and creating a new substantive and proce-
dural framework, the AG in Compean I stated that only in exceptional
circumstances did the BIA retain the discretion to reopen removal pro-
ceedings based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel.51  The new
standard also clearly made the process of reopening proceedings more
cumbersome for noncitizens negatively affected by defective counsel.52
Known as the “deficient performance of counsel” test, it required
the noncitizen first establish that his or her retained counsel’s errors
were “egregious,” not just that that counsel failed to perform with suf-
ficient competence.53  Additionally, the noncitizen had to show that he
was prejudiced by his former attorney’s error under a heightened
2004), Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000, 1005 (8th Cir. 2008), and Jamieson v. Gon-
zales, 424 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 2005).
46. 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988).
47. See infra notes 109-116 and accompanying text.
48. 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (Att’y Gen. 2009).
49. In re Compean (Compean I), 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 712 (Att’y Gen. 2009), vacated
by 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (Att’y Gen. 2009).
50. See Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 726 (concluding there is no constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings); see also American Immi-
gration Council page regarding Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, available at http://
www.legalactioncenter.org/litigation/ineffective-assistance-counsel.
51. Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 714.
52. See id. (stating that the AG created a new administrative framework for the
Board to comply with in reopening removal proceedings).
53. Id. at 732; compare id. (stating that an “alien must show that his lawyer’s fail-
ings were ‘egregious’”), with Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 638 (B.I.A. 1988)
(stating that the noncitizen must show he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient perform-
ance), and Matter of Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec. 553, 556 (B.I.A. 2003) (reiterating Lozada’s
standard); see also Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 793-94 (9th Cir. 2005) (ex-
plaining that an alien does not have to establish counsel’s deficient performance
changed the outcome of the proceeding, but merely must show prejudice due to counsel’s
performance).
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standard of prejudice.54  Indeed, the AG explained that to establish
prejudice under the new test, one had to show that “but for the defi-
cient performance, it is more likely than not that the alien would have
been entitled to the ultimate relief he was seeking[,]” a clear repudia-
tion of the reasonable probability standard previously adopted by the
BIA and several circuit courts.55
Most troubling perhaps is Compean I’s conclusion that a nonci-
tizen’s constitutional right to due process does not encompass a right
to effective counsel in removal proceedings.56  Rather, the AG explic-
itly held that “the Constitution [does not entitle] an alien who has
been harmed by his lawyer’s deficient performance in removal pro-
ceedings to redo those proceedings.”57
The AG reasoned that “there is no constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel under the Due Process Clause . . . in . . . civil
proceedings . . . [where] there is no constitutional right to counsel.”58
While the AG acknowledged “the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause applies in removal proceedings,” he stated that “that Clause
does not entitle an alien to effective assistance of counsel.”59
The AG gave two reasons for his conclusion that there is no con-
stitutional right to counsel in removal proceedings.60  First, he relied
on the Supreme Court’s conclusions that removal proceedings are
54. Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 732.
55. Compare id. at 733-34 (establishing the deficient performance test) (emphasis
added), with Ortiz-Puentes v. Holder, 662 F.3d 481, 485 n.2 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying
the reasonable probability test) (citing Obleshchenko v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 970, 972 (8th
Cir. 2004)); see also Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 884 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that
prejudice occurs when the violation “potentially . . . affects the outcome of the proceed-
ings”); Ambati v. Reno, 233 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 2000) (requiring the alien to show
that the due process violation had potential to affect the outcome); Kuciemba v. INS, 92
F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the petitioner must produce evidence show-
ing a procedural violation had the potential to affect the deportation proceeding’s
outcome).
56. Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 714.
57. Id. at 712.
58. Id. at 714.
59. Id.  The AG explains that “[u]nlike the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that ‘[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,’ applies to civil” proceedings. Id. at
717.  The AG also recognizes that due process applies to “all ‘persons’ within the United
States, including aliens,” and that “it is well established that the Fifth Amendment
entitles all aliens who have entered the United States to due process of law in removal
proceedings.” Id. (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) and Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)); see also Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at
212 (declaring, “[A]liens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be
expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encom-
passed in due process of law.”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (noting that
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment “applies to all ‘persons’ within the
United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, tempo-
rary, or permanent.”).
60. Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 716.
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civil—and not criminal—in nature;61 therefore, the Sixth Amend-
ment’s right to counsel does not apply.62  Second, he reasoned that the
“Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee . . . applies only against
the Government”63 and thus “the actions of a private party, including
a privately retained lawyer,” cannot deprive a noncitizen his due pro-
cess rights64 unless there is a “ ‘sufficiently close nexus’ between the
Federal Government . . . and the private party.”65
It is significant that the AG precisely applied the Eighth Circuit’s
reasoning in Rafiyev v. Mukasey,66 to Compean I.67  We will come
back to this point in the next section.
Less than a year after Compean I was decided, the newly ap-
pointed Attorney General Eric Holder vacated the decision in its en-
tirety and reinstated the Lozada framework by issuing a new decision,
Matter of Compean68 (“Compean II”).69  In Compean II, Attorney Gen-
eral Holder laments Compean I’s impetuous decision to implement a
“new, complex framework in place of a well-established and long-
61. Id. (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) and Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952)); see also Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038 (stat-
ing, “[a] deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain
in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry.”); Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. at 594 (de-
claring, “[d]eportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classi-
fied as a civil rather than a criminal procedure.”).
62. Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 716 (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,
237 (1960), Tang v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2003), United States v.
Loaisiga, 104 F.3d 484, 485 (1st Cir. 1997), Delgado-Corea v. INS, 804 F.2d 261, 262
(4th Cir. 1986), and United States v. Cerda-Pena, 799 F.2d 1374, 1376 n.2 (9th Cir.
1986)); see also Abel, 362 U.S. at 237 (noting, “deportation proceedings are not subject to
the constitutional safeguards for criminal prosecutions”).
63. Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 717 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
332 (1976)); see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332 (“stating that the Due Process Clause
applies only to ‘governmental decisions which deprive individuals of “liberty” or “prop-
erty” interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment’”) (emphasis added).
64. Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 717 (citing S. F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542-43 (1987)); accord S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at
542-43 (“stating that where a plaintiff alleges a violation of the Fifth Amendment, ‘[t]he
fundamental inquiry is whether the [defendant] is a governmental actor to whom the
prohibitions of the Constitution apply.’”).
65. Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 720 (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 351 (1974)); accord Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982) (“stating that
‘constitutional standards’ may be invoked to challenge private action ‘only when it can
be said that the [Government] is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plain-
tiff complains’”); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (“emphasizing
that the Due Process Clause applies to a private actor only if he may ‘fairly be said to be
a state actor.’”).
66. 536 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2008).
67. Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 720-21 (citing Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853,
860-61 (8th Cir. 2008)).
68. 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A. 2009).
69. Matter of Compean (Compean II), 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 1 (B.I.A. 2009).
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standing practice that had been reaffirmed by the Board in 2003 after
careful consideration.”70
Today Lozada remains the seminal case used by every circuit
court across the U.S. to analyze motions to reopen based upon ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel.71  But, as we will see below, the constitu-
tional foundation of Lozada has continued to come under attack.
III. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
EIGHT CIRCUIT’S REJECTION OF A DUE PROCESS
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL IN REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS
A. AN ASSUMED RIGHT
The first case where the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit addressed the question of ineffective assistance of
counsel in the context of a Lozada motion to reopen is Nativi-Gomez v.
Ashcroft,72 in 2003.73  There, the court recognized that noncitizens are
“entitle[d] . . . to due process of law in deportation proceedings,”74 and
the court also indicated that “some courts have explained that the in-
effective assistance of counsel can serve as the basis for a due process
violation.”75  However, in a footnote, the court stated that “[o]ur Cir-
cuit has yet to recognize the validity of a due-process claim in a depor-
tation proceeding based on the ineffective assistance of counsel.”76
Obleshchenko v. Ashcroft,77 was the next case to take up the is-
sue.  In Obleshchenko, the court again recognized that other circuits
had found a due process right to effective assistance of counsel in re-
moval proceedings78 and “assume[d] without deciding” that the mo-
vant “had a right to have [his] counsel effectively represent” him.79
70. Compean II, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 2.
71. See infra notes 109-116 and accompanying text.
72. 344 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 2004).
73. Nativi-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 805, 807 (8th Cir. 2004).
74. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).
75. Nativi-Gomez, 344 F.3d at 807 (citing Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 128 (2d
Cir. 2000) and Henry v. INS, 8 F.3d 426, 440 (7th Cir. 1993)); see also Iavorski, 232 F.3d
at 128 (expressing that the “statutory right to be represented by counsel [at one’s] own
expense . . . is ‘an integral part of the procedural due process to which the alien is
entitled.’”).
76. Nativi-Gomez, 344 F.3d at 809 n.1.  Instead, the court resolved the appeal on
other grounds and concluded that when a noncitizen is seeking discretionary relief, he
has no constitutionally protected liberty interest. Id. at 808.  Thus, the court explained
that adjustment of status, suspension of deportation, and motions to reopen, all of
which are discretionary forms of relief, are too “speculative” to constitute a “constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest.” Id.
77. 392 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 2004).
78. See Xu Yong Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2001); Lozada v. INS,
857 F.2d 10, 13–14 (1st Cir. 1988).
79. Obleshchenko v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 2004).
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The court did, however, express “serious doubts” that any such consti-
tutional right would exist in “civil [removal] proceedings.”80
A year later, in Etchu-Njang v. Gonzales,81 the court stated again
that it had “yet to recognize the validity of a due-process claim in a
deportation proceeding based upon the ineffective assistance of coun-
sel,” but resolved the case on other grounds and thus declined to reach
the issue.82
By 2006, the court in Habchy v. Gonzales83 moved further.  The
Eighth Circuit stated that it had squarely rejected “an absolute consti-
tutional right to effective assistance of counsel with respect to asylum
claims” while continuing to maintain that “the Fifth Amendment’s due
process clause mandates that removal hearings be fundamentally
fair.”84  The court characterized Obleshchenko as standing for that
proposition; however, in reality, Obleshchenko clearly stated that it
assumed the right without deciding.85  Aside from mischaracterizing
Obleshchenko’s holding,86 the court in Habchy did not offer any expla-
nation for why it believed there was no constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel in removal proceedings.
Rather, it was not until 2008, in the case of Rafiyev v. Mukasey,87
that the court finally offered an explanation for why it rejected the
existence of a constitutional right to effective counsel in removal pro-
ceedings in Habchy.88
B. RAFIYEV – THE COURT REJECTS ITS EARLIER ASSUMPTION
In Rafiyev v. Mukasey,89 the court began by declaring that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit “has never rec-
80. Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n Obleshchenko v.
Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 2004), we expressed ‘serious doubts . . . that a fifth
amendment right to counsel exists in civil deportation proceedings,’ because
‘[c]onstitutional rights are rights against the government,’ and we found it ‘difficult to
see how an individual, such as [an alien’s] attorney, who is not a state actor, can deprive
anyone of due process rights.’”).
81. 403 F.3d 577 (8th Cir. 2005).
82. Etchu-Njang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 577, 581-85 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Nativi-
Gomez, 344 F.3d at 808 n.1).
83. 471 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2006).
84. Habchy v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 858, 866 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Al Khouri v. Ash-
croft, 362 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2004)).
85. Habchy, 471 F.3d at 866.
86. It should be apparent that Habchy, decided in 2006, clearly misconstrued the
holding of Obleshchenko, decided in 2004.  The court recognized in 2005 that the Eighth
Circuit “has yet to decide the issue” of whether there is a “Fifth Amendment Due Pro-
cess” right in removal proceedings that includes a right to effective counsel. Jamieson v.
Gonzales, 424 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 2005).
87. 536 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2008).
88. Rafiyev, 536 F.3d at 860; Obleshchenko, 392 F.3d at 972.
89. 536 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2008).
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ognized a constitutional right to effective counsel in a removal pro-
ceedings.”90  The court relied upon the same two reasons that formed
the basis of the Attorney General’s decision in Compean I—the state
actor doctrine and the criminal/civil distinction—to conclude that
there is no constitutional right to effective counsel in removal
proceedings.91
First, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that because constitutional
rights are only rights against the government and a noncitizen’s attor-
ney is “not a state actor,” he or she cannot “deprive anyone of due
process rights.”92  Second, the court believed that the civil/criminal
distinction militated against finding a constitutional right to counsel
in removal proceedings, which have consistently been styled as civil
proceedings.93
To the first point, the court so concluded because it did not feel
that there was “a sufficient nexus between the federal government
and counsel’s ineffectiveness such that the latter may fairly be treated
as a governmental action.”94  The court relied heavily upon its under-
standing of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Coleman v.
Thompson95 in reaching its conclusion.96
In Coleman, the Supreme Court determined that where there is
no constitutional right to counsel in criminal proceedings, there can be
no constitutional violation for ineffective assistance of counsel even if
the attorney’s error would have otherwise failed the Strickland v.
Washington97 test.98  The Coleman court reasoned therefore that a
criminal defendant must “bear the risk of attorney error” where there
is no constitutional right to an attorney because it is the existence of a
right to counsel that permits errors of counsel to be “imputed to the
State.”99  In applying Coleman’s reasoning to immigration proceed-
ings, the Eighth Circuit held that errors of “[a noncitizen’s] attorney,
90. Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir. 2008).
91. See Rafiyev, 536 F.3d at 860-61; see also supra notes 60-65 and accompanying
text.
92. Rafiyev, 536 F.3d at 860; Obleshchenko, 392 F.3d at 972.
93. Rafiyev, 536 F.3d at 860-61 (citing Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975),
Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 385 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001), and Magallanes-Damian
v. INS, 783 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1986)).
94. Id. (citing Alfanwi v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788, 799 (4th Cir. 2008)).
95. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
96. See Rafiyev, 536 F.3d at 861 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752
(1991)).
97. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
98. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53.
99. Id. at 753-54.  While the Supreme Court has subsequently moved away from its
holding in Coleman, it does so for reasons that do not necessarily relate to our argument
here. See generally Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
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who is not a state actor,” likewise cannot deprive that noncitizen of his
due process rights.100
The second reason underlying the Eighth Circuit’s decision in
Rafiyev is the longstanding distinction made between criminal and
civil proceedings.101  As removal proceedings are not considered crimi-
nal proceedings, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply
in that setting.102  Accordingly, the court in Rafiyev rejected any Fifth
Amendment right to effective counsel, and because it ruled out any
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in non-criminal proceedings, it
thus concluded that no constitutional right to counsel exists at all in
civil immigration proceedings.
Once the court had concluded that “there is no constitutional
right to an attorney” in removal proceedings, it then held that a nonci-
tizen in those proceedings cannot claim “constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel.”103  In other words, the Eighth Circuit clearly
believed that a constitutional right to effective counsel rested squarely
on the more basic question of whether the constitution provides a
right to counsel at all in removal proceedings.
In deciding that no such right exists, the Eighth Circuit, like the
Supreme Court in Coleman, held that “[t]o the extent [a noncitizen’s]
counsel [is] ineffective, the federal government [is] not accountable for
[the] substandard performance;” rather such error must be “imputed
to the [noncitizen]” in immigration proceedings.104
While the court refused to recognize a constitutional right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel in removal proceedings, it did find that
under Matter of Lozada,105 Rafiyev could raise a non-constitutional
administrative claim that the BIA should exercise its discretionary
authority to reopen his case.106  However, as discussed further below,
this administrative claim to reopen proceedings has proved to be of
very little value for noncitizens aggrieved by defective counsel in the
Eighth Circuit, as the court has only twice granted, in the last fifteen
years, a petition for review raising the issue.107
100. Rafiyev, 536 F.3d at 860-61.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 861 (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752 and Wainright v. Torna, 455 U.S.
586, 587-588 (1982)).
104. Rafiyev, 536 F.3d at 861.
105. 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988).
106. Rafiyev, 536 F.3d at 861.
107. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.  Indeed, the court in Ochoa went so
far as to determine that it was without jurisdiction to even review the Board’s denial of
a motion to reopen removal proceedings based upon the ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.  Ochoa v. Holder, 604 F.3d 546, 548-50 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Tamenut v. Mukasey,
521 F.3d 1000, 1005 (8th Cir. 2008)). Ochoa is no longer good law following the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015); however, Ochoa illus-
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C. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
STANDS ALONE IN ITS CONCLUSION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s hold-
ing in Rafiyev v. Mukasey108—that there is no constitutional right to
effective counsel in removal proceedings—stands in stark contrast to
nearly every other circuit in the country to have addressed this is-
sue.109  Indeed, the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Sec-
ond, Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly
stated that because respondents in removal proceedings have a consti-
tutional right to due process, which includes a fundamentally fair
hearing, they necessarily have a constitutionally protected right to ef-
fective counsel insofar as it relates to the fairness of the proceed-
ings.110  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
assumed that to be the case without specifically deciding it.111  Simi-
larly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
indicated that being denied effective counsel could implicate a respon-
trates how far the Eighth Circuit has been willing to go to deny any review to
noncitizens deprived of a fair hearing as a result of defective counsel.
108. 536 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2008).
109. See Zeru v. Gonzalez, 503 F.3d 59, 72 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that “[i]neffective
assistance of counsel in a deportation proceeding is a denial of due process . . . [where]
the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasona-
bly presenting his case.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Perez, 330 F.3d 97, 101 (2d
Cir. 2003) (explaining that “an alien [can] prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, [if] he . . . show[s] that his counsel’s performance was so ineffective as to have
impinged upon the fundamental fairness of the hearing in violation of . . . due process.”)
(emphasis added); Contreras v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 578, 584 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing
that “[a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings is cognizable
under the Fifth Amendment . . . , as a violation of . . . due process” where it “under-
mine[s] the fundamental fairness of . . . proceedings.”) (emphasis added); Denko v. INS,
351 F.3d 717, 723 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that ineffective assistance of counsel in depor-
tation proceedings violates due process if “the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair
that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.”) (emphasis added);
Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 967-71 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that it is “particu-
larly important in removal proceedings” that an alien’s “due process right ‘includes a
right to competent representation”); Tang v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir.
2003) (stating that “[t]his court has recognized that the Fifth Amendment guarantees
aliens subject to deportation the right to a fundamentally fair deportation proceeding”
and that one can “state a Fifth Amendment violation if he proves that retained counsel
was ineffective and, as a result, [he] was denied a fundamentally fair proceeding.”) (em-
phasis added); Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004) (explain-
ing that “[an alien] . . . has the constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment . . . to a
fundamentally fair hearing and to effective assistance of counsel”) (emphasis added).
110. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (listing illustrative cases of circuit
courts positions on a noncitizen’s right to counsel in immigration proceedings).
111. See Mai v. Gonzalez, 473 F.3d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that “this court
has repeatedly assumed without deciding that an alien’s claim of ineffective assistance
may implicate due process concerns . . . .”).
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dent’s right to due process, though in other cases it has expressed
some doubts.112
Other than the Eighth Circuit, only the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has explicitly held that there is no con-
stitutional right to effective counsel in removal proceedings.113  The
court did so in Alfanwi v. Mukasey,114 for the same two reasons given
by the Eighth Circuit.115  However, Alfanwi was vacated116 by the
United States Supreme Court and thus the Eighth Circuit now stands
alone in declaring that there is no constitutional right to effective
counsel for immigrants in removal proceedings.
It is difficult to overstate the breathtaking implications of the
court’s holding in Rafiyev.  The court believes that an attorney in civil
removal proceedings can never be a state actor, and therefore, no mat-
ter how deficient the assistance, and no matter how damaging the re-
sult, it can never deprive a noncitizen in removal proceedings of his
Fifth Amendment right to due process.
Thus, even if an attorney were to commit an egregious error that
directly and unequivocally resulted in an unlawful deportation that
caused the death of a client, the court would have to conclude that no
constitutional deprivation occurred.117  To put it another way, in the
Eighth Circuit, a noncitizen in removal proceedings does not even
have the constitutional right to not be killed as a result of his counsel’s
defective service.  In an area of law, such as asylum, which so often
deals with matters of life and death, the hypothetical is not a chimera.
IV. THE ARGUMENT THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL DUE
PROCESS RIGHT TO FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS NECESSITATES A RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
The underlying reason for the availability to seek redress for
counsel’s errors in removal proceedings through a motion to reopen is
imbedded in the Constitution.  The Supreme Court has explained that
112. See Jezierski v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[t]he
complexity of the issues . . . in a particular removal proceeding might be so great that
forcing the alien to proceed without the assistance of a competent lawyer would deny
him due process of law . . . .”); but see Magala v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 523, 525-26 (7th Cir.
2005) (explaining in dicta that because immigration proceedings are civil, there is no
“constitutional ineffective-assistance” claim and thus the remedy is “damages for mal-
practice.”) (citing Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2001)).
113. Alfanwi v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788, 798 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated, 558 U.S. 801
(2009).
114. 526 F.3d 788 (4th Cir. 2008).
115. Alfanwi, 526 F.3d at 799.
116. Alfanwi v. Holder, 558 U.S. 801, 801 (2009).
117. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
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“[i]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles [nonci-
tizens] to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”118  Nearly
every circuit court in the country has held that this right to due pro-
cess in removal proceedings includes a right to effective counsel.119
And the Board has also held that “[i]neffective assistance of counsel in
a deportation proceeding is a denial of due process under the Fifth
Amendment if the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the
[noncitizen] was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.”120
Indeed, the right to a fundamentally fair hearing is virtually worth-
less if confined to a legal framework in which the fairness of the pro-
ceedings can never be affected by prejudicial errors of defective
counsel.121
A. THE MEANINGLESSNESS OF A RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING THAT
DOES NOT ENCOMPASS A RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law.”122  The United States Supreme Court has long
maintained that the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause applies to
aliens in removal proceedings.123  The Court has also held that the
“touchstone” of due process is the requirement that proceedings be
fundamentally fair, which includes the right to be heard.124
118. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523
(2003) (quoting Flores, 507 U.S. at 306); see also Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2153-54
(2015) (determining that the circuit court had jurisdiction over an appeal of the denial of
an alien’s otherwise untimely motion to reopen removal proceedings, when the motions
untimeliness is due to the ineffective assistance of council).
119. See supra notes 109-117 and accompanying text.
120. Ortiz v. INS, 179 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Matter of Lozada, 19
I. & N. Dec. 637, 638 (B.I.A. 1988) (stating that “[i]neffective assistance of counsel in a
deportation proceeding is a denial of due process only if the proceeding was so funda-
mentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.”);
Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 479 (B.I.A. 2011) (stating that “[a] removal hear-
ing must be conducted in a manner that satisfies principles of fundamental fairness.”).
121. Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2008).
122. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added); see also Plyler v. Doe 457 U.S. 202,
210 (1982) (stating that, “[a]liens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlaw-
ful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
123. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); Landon v. Plascenia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-
33 (1982); Wing Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); see also Shaughnessey
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (stating that immigration pro-
ceedings must conform to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process).
124. Gangon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973); see also Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (discussing the due process right to be heard); Yamataya v.
Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (explaining in the context of deportation proceedings
that “no person shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be
heard”).
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In Gideon v. Wainwright,125 the Supreme Court explained that
the due process “right to be heard would be . . . of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”126  Although the
court in Gideon addressed the right to be heard in criminal proceed-
ings, the Supreme Court has held that a right to counsel can be re-
quired by the due process clause in civil proceedings as well.127
As explained above, nearly every circuit court in the country to
address this issue has likewise concluded that the due process right to
fundamental fairness in removal proceedings includes a right to be
heard by counsel and is infringed when the ineffective assistance of
counsel undermines the fairness of proceedings.128
That conclusion is aptly supported by Matthews v. Eldridge,129
the Supreme Court’s seminal procedural due process decision.  There,
the court articulated a three-prong test to determine the parameters
of procedural due process.130  One must weigh (1) the private interests
affected by the official action, (2) the “risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used,” and (3) the government
interests affected, including fiscal and administrative burdens that
would result if the procedure were required.131
These factors, when weighed and balanced against each other,
clearly tip in favor of holding that there is a constitutional right to
effective counsel in removal proceedings under the due process
clause.132  It is my position that this conclusion constitutionally re-
quires a procedure for reopening proceedings when ineffective counsel
has rendered those proceedings fundamentally unfair.
To the first prong in Matthews, in removal proceedings there is an
elevated private liberty interest at stake for the individual facing de-
portation.  Justice Brandeis observed many years ago that “[deporta-
tion] may result also in loss [of] . . . all that makes life worth living.”133
125. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
126. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (citing Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
127. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1981) (stating that, “it is
[an] . . . interest in personal freedom, and not simply the Sixth . . . Amendment[ ] right
to counsel in criminal cases, which triggers the right to appointed counsel . . . even
though proceedings may be styled ‘civil’ and not ‘criminal.’”) (citing In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 41 (1967)); Gault, 387 U.S. at 41 (concluding there is a right to counsel in certain
civil delinquency proceedings); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 483-84, 497 (1980) (stating
a plurality held that the due process clause could in some circumstances require a right
to counsel in civil proceedings).
128. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
129. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
130. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
131. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
132. Id.
133. Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
542 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
And, the Court has indicated that deportation is a drastic measure,
and at times “the equivalent of banishment or exile.”134  Indeed, the
Court in Padilla v. Kentucky135 stated that “[w]e have long recognized
that deportation is a particularly severe ‘penalty . . . .’ ”136  As far back
as 1903, the Court acknowledged that a noncitizen has a liberty inter-
est in his “right to be and remain in the United States.”137  The pri-
vate interest affected is, at a minimum, the ability to live and work in
the United States, the ability to not be separated from home and fam-
ily, and the ability to not be detained and ultimately exiled to a foreign
land.
To the second prong in Matthews, the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of these private liberty interests is high when a noncitizen in
removal proceedings is deprived of effective counsel.  It is now axio-
matic that persons facing deprivation of a liberty interest are guaran-
teed a fundamentally fair hearing under the due process clause.138
Yet when counsel is so deficient as to render those proceedings funda-
mentally unfair, a refusal to reopen removal proceedings would un-
questionably result in “an erroneous deprivation” of the liberty
interests referenced above.139  As such, protection against an errone-
ous deprivation in removal proceedings necessitates a right to effec-
tive counsel that includes the ability to reopen proceedings when they
have been rendered unfair by deficient counsel.
Comprehensive studies have shown that the single most impor-
tant factor in one’s chance at success in their immigration case is the
presence or absence of counsel.140  As such, it is inconceivable to as-
sert that a hearing can be fair when a person has lost the ability to
remain in the United States as a result of counsel’s errors.141  For ex-
134. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010).
135. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
136. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
740 (1893)).
137. Yamataya v. Fisher 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903); see also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135, 150-54 (1945) (explaining that the “rules are designed to protect the interest of the
alien and afford him due process of law . . . safeguards against essentially unfair proce-
dures  . . . .  Here the liberty of an individual is at stake”).
138. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306-07 (1993) (examining the INS procedures
for deportation); see supra notes 123-128 and accompanying text; see generally Ellison,
Extending Due Process Protection to Unadmitted Aliens Within the U.S. Through the
Functional Approach of Boumediene, 3 the crit: Critical Stud. J. 1 (2010).
139. Mathews, 424 U.S at 335.
140. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Philip G. Schrag, Refugee
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (Nov. 2007)
(stating “[r]epresented asylum seekers were granted asylum at a rate of 45.6%, almost
three times as high as the 16.3% grant rate for those without legal counsel.  The regres-
sion analyses confirmed that, with all other variables in the study held constant, repre-
sented asylum seekers were substantially more likely to win their case than those
without representation.”).
141. Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2008).
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ample, there have been instances in which a noncitizen’s lawyer has
failed to even file a brief on appeal, resulting in the automatic loss of
the case.142  When such clients have a meritorious claim to remain in
the United States and are denied that right due to ineffective counsel,
they unequivocally experience an erroneous deprivation of that right if
denied the ability to reopen their proceedings.
The Supreme Court has explained that “recent changes in . . . im-
migration law” have “dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s
criminal conviction” such that “deportation is an integral part—in-
deed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be
imposed on noncitizen defendants . . . .”143  Numerous courts have rec-
ognized the importance of competent counsel to avoid an erroneous
deprivation of that high personal interest at stake.144
In contrast, when considering the final prong of the Matthews
analysis, the government’s interests and burdens in this analysis are
minimal.  In the circuits that have held that there is a constitutional
right to effective counsel in removal proceedings, which includes a
right to file a motion to reopen, the government is not being forced to
appoint counsel in immigration proceedings.145
Likewise, such motions to reopen do not subject the government
to any financial or administrative burdens outside of having to rehear
certain cases that were found to be fundamentally unfair due to coun-
sel’s errors.  The Board of Immigration Appeals and the majority of
circuit courts across the country already impose this rule on the gov-
ernment.146  That the right has existed for nearly thirty years, and in
so many circuits, establishes that the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens are slight, particularly when weighed against the substantial lib-
erty interest at stake.147
142. See, e.g., Correa-Rivera v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013); Xu Yong
Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 129-30 (3d Cir. 2001); Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889,
901 (9th Cir. 2003).
143. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364-66.
144. See id. at 364; see also Nehad, 535 F.3d at 967 (explaining that
“[r]epresentation by competent counsel is particularly important in removal proceed-
ings because ‘[t]he proliferation of immigration laws and regulations has aptly been
called a labyrinth that only a lawyer could navigate.’”); see also supra note 109 and
accompanying text.
145. Tang v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2003).  This fact also distin-
guishes the instant case from Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 109 (1989), which ad-
dresses the right to appointed counsel when seeking post-conviction relief.
146. Matter of Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec. 553, 556-58 (2003); see supra notes 109-113
and accompanying text.
147. The Attorney General (“AG”) has also recognized its interest in regulating who
may practice before the BIA and Immigration Courts for the purpose of “the protection
of the public, the preservation of the integrity of the immigration courts, and the main-
tenance of high professional standards.” Professional Conduct for Practitioners – Rules
and Procedures, 65 FR 39513-01, 39514 (June 27, 2000).  The AG stated that these goals
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In sum, the conclusion that a noncitizen in immigration proceed-
ings has a Fifth Amendment due process right to effective counsel,
which includes a procedure to correct errors of counsel, is well sup-
ported in the law and follows necessarily from the axiomatic conclu-
sion that removal proceedings must be fundamentally fair.  It borders
on the absurd to say one has a right to a fair hearing, but that right
does not extend to correcting prejudicial errors of defective counsel.
Where a lawyer misses a deadline and permanently destroys all
chances of prevailing in a case,148 for one with a meritorious claim to
relief, the right to a fundamentally fair hearing would be of no value
at all if it does not encompass a right to correct prejudicial errors of
defective counsel.149  In such situations, the two rights are synony-
mous, coextensive, and meaningless if separated from one another.
B. THE CONGRUENCE OF A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
COUNSEL IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS WITH THE STATE ACTOR
DOCTRINE
As explained above, the Attorney General (“AG”) in Matter of
Compean150 (“Compean I”) and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit in Rafiyev v. Mukasey,151 both held that because
only state actors can deprive individuals of their constitutional rights,
and because counsel in immigration proceedings is never a state actor,
one can never claim a constitutional deprivation, even when the attor-
ney commits egregious errors that result in manifest injustice.152
However, it is my opinion that the AG and the Eighth Circuit
erred in Rafiyev and Compean I by circularly misapplying the state
actor doctrine.153  The United States Supreme Court has explained
numerous times that where there is a constitutional right to counsel
and an individual has been prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of
even a privately retained, non-appointed attorney, the error is im-
puted to the state.154
are “important public interest objectives.” Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 292.1(a); 8 C.F.R.
§ 3.102(k) (providing that practitioners who engage in ineffective assistance can be
sanctioned).
148. Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Said, 869 N.W.2d 185, 189
(Iowa 2015); Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Mendez, 855 N.W.2d
156, 162 (Iowa 2014).
149. Nehad, 535 F.3d at 967.
150. 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (Att’y Gen. 2009).
151. 536 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2008).
152. Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir. 2008); Obleshchenko v. Ash-
croft, 392 F.3d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 2004).
153. See infra notes 154-160 and accompanying text.
154. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54 (1991) (determining that when
an attorney’s error “constitutes a violation of petitioner’s right to counsel, . . . the error
must be seen as [being] imputed to the State.”) (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396
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Indeed, the Supreme Court in Cuyler v. Sullivan155 explained
that a retained attorney whose error, of which state officials neither
knew nor had reason to know, could provide inadequate representa-
tion such that would “render a trial so fundamentally unfair as to vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment[’s]” due process clause.156  In fact,
the Court explicitly rejected the argument that there could be no con-
stitutional violation because there was no state action.157  Rather, the
Court reasoned that where “proceedings [are] initiated and conducted
by the State,” and an unjust result is obtained by the State because of
inadequate assistance of counsel, “it is the State that unconstitution-
ally deprives the defendant of his liberty.”158
This reasoning, in the context of criminal proceedings, is equally
applicable to civil removal proceedings.  Indeed, the Court has never
limited its holding regarding the right to counsel simply to criminal
proceedings involving the Sixth Amendment.159  Rather, the Supreme
Court has held on several occasions that the right to even appointed
counsel can be required by the due process clause in civil
proceedings.160
Accordingly, there is no principled reason for finding state action
where there has been a violation of one’s right to counsel in criminal
proceedings, while refusing to find state action where there has been a
violation of a one’s right to counsel in civil proceedings.  The Supreme
Court’s reasoning regarding the right to counsel and state action is
equally applicable in both contexts.
C. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS TO FINDING A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE COUNSEL IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
There are two practical implications at stake if the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reverses Rafiyev v.
(1985)); see also Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396 (declaring, “[t]he constitutional mandate guar-
anteeing effective assistance of counsel is addressed to the action of the State in ob-
taining a criminal conviction through a procedure that fails to meet the standards of
due process of law.”); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (stating that “if the
procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amend-
ment itself requires that responsibility for the default is imputed to the State.”) (citing
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)).
155. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
156. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 343-44.
157. See id. at 344-45 (stating “we see no basis for drawing a distinction between
retained and appointed counsel.”).
158. Id.
159. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
160. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981)
(applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to proceedings outside the criminal
context); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 483, 493 (1980)
(concluding by plurality that the due process clause could require a right to counsel in
civil proceedings).
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Mukasey,161 and finds there is a constitutional right to effective coun-
sel in removal proceedings.  First, a reversal should result in ob-
taining a better standard of review of denials by the BIA of motions to
reopen based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.  Second, it would
represent an important preventative measure against future attempts
to eliminate the BIA’s Lozada162 decision.
Because constitutional claims are given a de novo standard of re-
view by a reviewing court,163 if the Eighth Circuit were to explicitly
hold that an alien has a due process right to effective counsel in re-
moval proceedings, it should result in obtaining de novo review of the
BIA’s denials of motions to reopen on this basis, rather than the ex-
traordinarily deferential level of review presently given to such deci-
sions.164  Indeed, at present, the court’s deferential “abuse of
discretion” standard is currently used to review such decisions.165
It should come as no surprise then that in the last fifteen years,
the Eighth Circuit has only twice granted a petition for review of a
denial by the BIA of a motion to reopen for ineffective assistance
of counsel, out of twenty-five published decisions on the issue.166
161. 536 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2008).
162. 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1996).
163. Njorge v. Holder, 753 F.3d 809, 811 (8th Cir. 2014).  In the context of reviewing
a claim for denial of access to counsel, the court has stated that it “review[s] due process
challenges de novo.” Njorge, 755 F.3d at 811.
164. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 493 (1991); Habchy v. Gon-
zales, 471 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Shoaira v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 837, 842
(8th Cir. 2004)); Contreras v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 578, 583 (3d Cir. 2012); Sing v.
Lynch, 803 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2015); see also infra note 165 and accompanying text.
165. Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 856-58 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating “[t]he BIA’s
discretionary decision . . . is conclusive unless ‘manifestly contrary to the law and an
abuse of discretion.’”); Ortiz-Puentes v. Holder, 662 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 2011) (not-
ing that the Eighth Circuit “review[s] the BIA’s decision to deny a timely motion to
reopen under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”).  Under the substantial evi-
dence standard, factual findings are treated as “conclusive unless any reasonable adju-
dicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Singh, 803 F.3d at 991 (citing
Sandoval–Loffredo v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 892, 895 (8th Cir. 2005)).
166. Singh, 803 F.3d at 994 (Denied); Lee v. Holder, 765 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir.
2014) (Denied); Salman v. Holder, 687 F.3d 991, 993 (8th Cir. 2012) (Denied); Ortiz-
Puentes, 662 F.3d at 485 (Denied); Valencia v. Holder, 657 F.3d 745, 749 (8th Cir. 2011)
(Denied); Ortega-Marroquin v. Holder, 640 F.3d 814, 820-21 (8th Cir. 2011) (Granted);
Pafe v. Holder, 615 F.3d 967, 970 (8th Cir. 2010) (Denied); Ochoa v. Holder, 604 F.3d
546, 547 (8th Cir. 2010) (Denied); Ezeagwu v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 836, 837 (8th Cir.
2008) (Denied); Rafiyev, 536 F.3d at 861 (Granted); Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d
1000, 1005 (8th Cir. 2008) (Denied); Guled v. Mukasey 515 F.3d 872, 883 (8th Cir. 2008)
(Denied); Lubale v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 2007) (Denied); Habchy, 471
F.3d at 868 (Denied); Haider v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 902, 910 (8th Cir. 2006) (Denied);
Dominguez-Capistran v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2005) (Denied) rev’d en banc,
438 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2006); Hernandez-Moran v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 496, 500 (8th Cir.
2005) (Denied); Kanyi v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1087, 1091 (8th Cir. 2005) (Denied); Etchu-
Njang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 577, 585 (8th Cir. 2005) (Denied); Guerra-Soto v. Ashcroft,
397 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2005) (Denied); Jamieson v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir.
2005) (Denied); Obleshchenko v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 2004) (Denied); Al
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And it has done so only once since the court issued its decision in
Rafiev.167
If the Eighth Circuit abandons Rafiev and adopts its fellow circuit
courts’ holding that effective assistance of counsel is a constitutional
right under the Fifth Amendment, the court should begin reviewing
the Board’s denials of such ineffective assistance of counsel claims de
novo.168  Such a move would give aggrieved noncitizens a much better
chance at success before the Eighth Circuit.
Second, as shown above, Lozada is not immune from attack and
may be reversed by the United States Attorney General.  Just like AG
Mukasey, a future AG has the authority to eradicate or alter the ad-
ministrative structure of Lozada to make it dramatically more diffi-
cult for aliens negatively affected by deficient counsel to prevail in
their motions to reopen.169
In the Eighth Circuit, the only reason such motions are presently
reviewed is because it is the framework currently used by the
Board.170  Were the Board to cease accepting such motions (or dra-
matically limit them as occurred in Compean I171) in circuits where
the right has been founded upon the due process clause, noncitizens
would be able to continue to make such motions before the Board and
seek review of any denials before the courts of appeals.172  However,
absent a constitutional basis for motions to reopen based upon ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, were the AG to overrule Lozada, nonci-
tizens would be without recourse in circuits such as the Eighth
Circuit.
For these reasons, Rafiyev’s reversal represents an important
safeguard and needed change for noncitizens suffering from deficient
assistance of counsel in the Eighth Circuit, both now and into the
future.
Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 466, 467 (8th Cir. 2004) (Granted); Nativi-Gomez v. Ash-
croft, 344 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 2003) (Denied); Ismailov v. Reno, 263 F.3d 851, 855
(8th Cir. 2001) (Denied).
167. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
168. McNary, 498 U.S. at 493; Contreras, 665 F. 3d at 583.
169. See supra notes 48-70 and accompanying text; see also Matter of Compean
(Compean I), 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 712 (Att’y Gen. 2009), vacated by, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1
(Att’y Gen. 2009); Matter of Compean (Compean II), 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 1-2 (Att’y Gen.
2009).
170. Notwithstanding the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Ochoa, the Supreme Court has
held that the United States Courts of Appeals have the jurisdiction to review decisions
by the Board’s decision on this matter. Mata v. Lynch, 135 S.Ct. 2150, 2156-57 (2015);
cf. Ochoa v. Holder, 604 F.3d 546, 548-50 (8th Cir. 2008).
171. 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (Att’y Gen. 2009).
172. See In re Hector Ponce de Leon, 21 I. & N. Dec. 154, 159 (B.I.A. 1996) (stating
that the Board is obligated to follow circuit law).  However, courts afford agencies no
deference in interpreting the Constitution. See U.S. W., Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224,
1231 (10th Cir.1999) (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190–91 (1991)).
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V. STRATEGIES FOR ARGUING FOR THE REVERSAL OF
RAFIYEV IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
already declared that it is bound by prior precedent on this issue in
Singh v. Lynch;173 however, it is not clear what arguments, if any,
were placed before the court to reverse course in Singh.  While one
possible option for combating Rafiyev v. Mukasey174 would be to seek
review before the United States Supreme Court, in this section I pre-
sent several possible strategies for requesting a future panel of the
Eighth Circuit, or the full court sitting en banc, to reverse Rafiyev.175
The Eighth Circuit has explained that “it is well settled that a
panel may depart from circuit precedent” if there is “an intervening
opinion of the Supreme Court that undermines” or casts doubt on the
prior panel’s decision.176  The panel reviewing the prior precedent in
light of an intervening Supreme Court opinion is required to “explic-
itly identify the error or changed circumstances and explain why a
different result is justified.”177  An error or changed circumstance in-
cludes cases in which the reasoning of the intervening Supreme Court
opinion is inconsistent with the reasoning of past panel precedent.178
A. THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT’S REASONING
IN PADILLA AND THE BRIGHT LINE RULE USED BY THE EIGHT
CIRCUIT IN RAFIYEV
The reasoning behind the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Rafiyev v. Mukasey179 rests squarely upon
the outmoded distinction between criminal and civil proceedings to
hold that “there is no constitutional right to an attorney” in removal
proceedings, which are “civil.”180  However, the United States Su-
173. Singh v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 988, 993 (8th Cir. 2015) (rejecting Singh’s request for
the court to depart from Rafiyev and find a Fifth Amendment right to effective counsel
in removal proceedings) (citing Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir.
2011) (en banc)).
174. 536 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2008).
175. FED. R. APP. P. 35 (2015).
176. Northport Health Serv. of Ark., LLC v. Rutherford, 605 F.3d 483, 489 (8th Cir.
2010) (citing Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Little Rock Cardiology Clinic, P.A., 551
F.3d 812, 821 (8th Cir. 2009)); see also United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969, 975 (8th
Cir. 2008) (discussing review of prior circuit decisions) (citing Patterson v. Tenet
Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 1997)).
177. Williams, 537 F.3d at 975 (citing Jacobs v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 36, 38 (8th Cir.
1993)).
178. Id.
179. 536 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2008).
180. Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 2008).
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preme Court’s decision in Padilla v Kentucky181 has significantly
eroded this distinction.  While noting that the “particularly severe
‘penalty’” of deportation “is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction,”
the Court “find[s] it ‘most difficult’ to divorce the penalty from the con-
viction in the deportation context.”182
In recognizing that the weighty liberty interest in “preserving the
client’s right to remain in the United States may be more important to
the client than any potential jail sentence,” the court holds that the
Sixth Amendment and Strickland v. Washington183 require competent
counsel to advise noncitizens accused of crimes “whether his plea car-
ries a risk of deportation.”184
Although the context of Padilla is distinguishable from the issue
at hand, as our discussion in this Article is confined to the right in
removal proceedings, its reasoning is applicable.  The punitive nature
of deportation sets removal proceedings apart from other purely civil
proceedings such that the ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in
deportation can no longer be brushed aside as a purely civil
consequence.185
In these respects, the Supreme Court’s holding in Padilla “under-
mines” the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Rafiyev insofar as the Eighth
Circuit relies upon a strict distinction between civil and criminal pro-
ceedings.186  Inconsistency between circuit law and Supreme Court
precedent has been established in the Eighth Circuit as a justification
for a current panel to depart from reliance on past panel precedent.187
Therefore, the court should at least reexamine its holding in Rafiyev
based upon the intervening Supreme Court precedent touching upon
this issue.
181. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
182. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365-66 (2010).
183. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
184. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374.
185. See id. at 373-74 (discussing the severity in consequence of deportation pro-
ceedings).  As Justice Alito points out in his concurring opinion, “criminal convictions
can carry a wide variety of consequences . . . including civil commitment, civil forfeiture,
the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess
firearms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and the loss of business or
professional licenses.” Id. at 376 (Alito, J., concurring).  However, he explains that al-
though “those consequences are ‘serious,’ . . . this Court has never held that a criminal
defense attorney’s Sixth Amendment duties extend to providing advice about such mat-
ters.” Id.
186. Northport Health Serv., 605 F.3d at 489.
187. Williams, 537 F.3d at 975.
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B. RAFIYEV’S MISAPPLICATION OF THE STATE ACTOR DOCTRINE
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit’s reasoning in Rafiyev v. Mukasey188 regarding the state actor
doctrine is terribly flawed.  As explained above, the court held that
because counsel in immigration proceedings are not state actors and
only state actors can deprive constitutional rights, a noncitizen in re-
moval proceedings can never have his due process right infringed by
defective counsel, irrespective of how catastrophic the damage.189
However, the court’s reasoning in Rafiyev is utterly circular when
the doctrine of state action is viewed in its proper light.190  As ex-
plained above, the United States Supreme Court has long held that
where there is a constitutional right to counsel and an individual has
been prejudiced by defective counsel, the error is imputed to the state
as a matter of law.191
Because it is the conclusion that one has a right to counsel that
requires counsel’s errors be imputed to the state,192 it is circular to
use the state action doctrine to resolve the question of whether there
is a right to counsel.  The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning is incoherent to
the extent that it bases its conclusion that there is no right to counsel
on its earlier conclusion that private immigration attorneys are not
state actors,193 when the issue of state action in this context turns
upon the more fundamental question of whether there is any right to
counsel.  In short, because the Eighth Circuit assumes there is no
right to counsel, it finds there is no state action.  However, given that
the presence or absence of state action rests upon the more basic con-
clusion of whether there is a right to counsel,194 it is nonsense to seek
to use the state actor doctrine to resolve whether there is a right to
counsel.
188. 536 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2008).
189. Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir. 2008); Obleshchenko v. Ash-
croft, 392 F.3d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 2004).
190. See supra notes 154-160 and accompanying text.
191. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991) (stating that when an at-
torney’s error “constitutes a violation of petitioner’s right to counsel, . . . the error must
be seen as [being] imputed to the State.”) (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396
(1985) and Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)); see also Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396
(expressing that “[t]he constitutional mandate [guaranteeing effective assistance of
counsel] is addressed to the action of the State in obtaining a criminal conviction
through a procedure that fails to meet the standards of due process of law.”); Murray,
477 U.S. at 488 (explaining that “if the procedural default is the result of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the
default be imputed to the State.”) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)).
192. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 343-45.
193. Rafiyev, 536 F.3d at 860.
194. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 343-45.
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Instead, in order for the court to continue to find that there is no
right to effective counsel in removal proceedings, it must be able to
meaningfully explain how it is possible for a noncitizen to enjoy his
right to a fundamentally fair hearing when defective counsel renders
those proceedings unfair.  If noncitizens are constitutionally without
recourse in such cases, how could their proceedings possibly be fair?  It
is my position that the court has not and cannot answer that question.
C. THE EIGHT CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN RAFIYEV IS AT ODDS WITH ITS
REASONING IN SEVERAL OTHER PRECEDENT DECISIONS
In addition to the errors in Rafiyev v. Mukasey’s195 reasoning laid
out above, the court’s holding in Rafiyev is also inconsistent with prior
and subsequent United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit
precedent.  In United States v. Torres-Sanchez,196 the Eighth Circuit
recognized in 1995 that an alien has both a statutory and a constitu-
tional right to counsel.197  In Torres-Sanchez, the court held that “de-
priving an alien of the right to counsel” could constitute “a due process
violation.”198  More recently, in 2004, the court in Al Khouri v. Ash-
croft199 reaffirmed a due process right to counsel in removal proceed-
ings.200  Indeed, the court explained that:
It is well-settled that, while there is no Sixth Amendment
right to counsel[,] . . . aliens have a statutory right to counsel
at their own expense[,] . . . and are entitled to the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law in deportation
proceedings.  In certain circumstances, depriving an alien of
the right to counsel may rise to the level of a due process
violation.201
Thus, the court’s claim in Rafiyev—that the Eighth Circuit has never
held that a noncitizen in removal proceedings has a due process right
to counsel—is not entirely true.
Likewise, the court’s holding in Rafiyev—that an alien has no con-
stitutional right to an attorney—conflicts with Njorge v. Holder;202
195. 536 F.3d 583 (8th. Cir. 2008).
196. 68 F.3d 227 (8th Cir. 1995).
197. United States v. Torres-Sanchez, 68 F.3d 227, 230 (8th Cir. 1995).
198. Torres-Sanchez, 68 F.3d at 230-231 (citing United States v. Campos-Asencio,
822 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1987)); accord Campos-Asencio, 822 F.2d at 509 (stating “an
alien has a right to counsel if the absence of counsel would violate due process under the
fifth amendment . . . .  Aliens also have a statutory right to counsel, although not at
Government expense.”).
199. 362 F.3d 461 (8th Cir. 2004).
200. Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 462 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Torres–Sanchez,
68 F.3d at 230).
201. Al Khouri, 362 F.3d at 462 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006); Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); Torres-Sanchez, 68 F.3d at 230).
202. 753 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2014).
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the court’s own and more recent holding.203  In 2014, the court in
Njorge acknowledged that the right to counsel exists in removal pro-
ceedings to the extent that an alien is entitled to the Fifth Amend-
ment’s guarantee of due process of law.204
While the panels in United States v. Torres-Sanchez,205 Njorge,
and Al Khouri were not addressing the issue of ineffective assistance
of counsel, but rather the right to have counsel at one’s hearing, the
reasoning in those decisions is irreconcilable with the court’s reason-
ing in Rafiyev.  Indeed, it makes no sense to say one has a constitu-
tional right to have counsel present at removal proceedings, while
asserting elsewhere that there is no right to effective counsel.206
Rather, it seems that in some circumstances—such as in the case
of a missed filing deadline—having defective counsel may actually be
worse than having no counsel at all.  For this reason, it is my view
that the court’s holdings in Torres-Sanchez, Al Khouri, and Njorge
could be used to lay the legal groundwork to overrule Rafiyev.
Contrary to Rafiyev’s holding, Torres-Sanchez, Al Khouri, and
Njorge make it clear that a noncitizen has a constitutional right to
counsel in circumstances when the absence of counsel would violate
his Fifth Amendment due process rights.207  Therefore, it follows that
if a noncitizen has a recognized constitutional right to counsel in cir-
cumstances when having no counsel would be a violation of that right,
then a noncitizen must also at least have a right to effective counsel
whenever ineffective counsel would be as bad as having no counsel at
all.
In sum, there are substantial legal errors related to the Eighth
Circuit’s state actor doctrine and heavy reliance upon a strict crimi-
nal/civil distinction in immigration matters, a dichotomy significantly
eroded by the Supreme Court in Padilla.  Additionally, there is incon-
sistency within the Eighth Circuit’s jurisprudence on the issue of a
due process right to counsel in removal proceedings.  Moreover, it logi-
cally follows that if there is a right to a fair hearing in removal pro-
ceedings, that right is of little value if divorced from a right to effective
counsel.  Consequently, it is time for the court to revisit its decision in
203. Njorge v. Holder, 753 F.3d 809, 811 (8th Cir. 2014).
204. Njorge, 753 F.3d at 811 (citing Uspango v. Ashcroft, 289 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir.
2002); Flores, 507 U.S. at 306; Torres-Sanchez, 68 F.3d at 230).
205. 68 F.3d 227 (8th Cir. 1995).
206. Indeed, even the court in Rafiyev appears to accept the conclusion that the
right to counsel and the right to effective counsel are inextricably entwined. Rafiyev v.
Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 2008).
207. See Rafiyev, 536 F.3d at 861 (denying that the Fifth Amendment grants the
right to effective counsel in removal proceedings); see also Torres-Sanchez, 68 F.3d at
230 (stating that “in some circumstances, depriving an alien of the right to counsel may
rise to a due process violation.”).
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Rafiyev and choose to adopt the rule shared by the vast majority of its
sister circuits that there is a constitutional right to effective counsel in
immigration proceedings under the Fifth Amendment.208
VI. CONCLUSION
The story of Mr. Utoc Garcia, with which we began this Article, is
one all too common in the practice of immigration law.209  Unscrupu-
lous lawyers, and those masquerading as lawyers, too often take ad-
vantage of immigrants seeking to traverse the U.S. immigration
system, one that has been aptly described as a “labyrinth that only a
lawyer could navigate.”210  Indeed, cultural and linguistic barriers,
unfamiliarity with our legal processes, and the timidity often accom-
panying an uncertain immigration status work together to prevent
many noncitizens from knowing their rights, let alone seeking to en-
force them.211
Indeed, one of the significant reasons immigration lawyers have
some of the lowest malpractice insurance rates among all practice ar-
eas212 is because when errors occur, it often results in the removal of
the client from the country.213  This outcome makes it exceedingly dif-
ficult for the client to seek redress in the form of a subsequent mal-
practice suit.
Moreover, while clients can and do occasionally win malpractice
suits against former deficient counsel, the remedy is limited to mone-
tary damages.  This does not allow for the aggrieved and wrongfully
deported client to return to his home or property in the United States.
It cannot give him the ability to live and work in the United States.
208. Contreras v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 578, 584 (3d Cir. 2012); Nehad v. Mukasey,
535 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2008); Zeru v. Gonzalez, 503 F.3d 59, 72-73 (1st Cir. 2007);
Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Perez,
330 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2003); Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 723-24 (6th Cir. 2003);
Tang v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2003).
209. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also Court Suspends Des Moines




210. Nehad, 535 F.3d at 967 (explaining that “[r]epresentation by competent coun-
sel is particularly important in removal proceedings because ‘[t]he proliferation of immi-
gration laws and regulations has aptly been called a labyrinth that only a lawyer could
navigate.’”).
211. Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1382 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that immi-
gration forms “are frequently filled out by poor, illiterate people who do not speak En-
glish and are unable to retain counsel.”).
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And it cannot end the separation he experiences with his friends and
family that remain in the United States.  Indeed, it cannot make him
whole after a loss of “all that makes life worth living.”214  This fact
alone should silence those who would assert that the only remedy for
noncitizens denied justice in removal proceedings is a malpractice suit
against the deficient attorney.
The extreme penalty of deportation is what distinguishes civil im-
migration proceedings from other civil proceedings.  Wherein most
civil proceedings are simply about the allocation of monetary dam-
ages, immigration removal proceedings are about one’s weighty lib-
erty interests in being able to remain free from detention in one’s
home with one’s family and friends.  Thus, while in ordinary civil pro-
ceedings, a malpractice suit against one’s former counsel can indeed
make one whole in most instances; in removal proceedings, monetary
damages cannot even come close.  Thus, as alluded to by the Supreme
Court in Padilla v Kentucky,215 it is time to end the absurd legal fic-
tion that immigration proceedings are purely civil proceedings.
In the nation that so eloquently declares at the foot of its monu-
ment to liberty, “[g]ive me your tired, your poor, [y]our huddled
masses yearning to breathe free,”216 it is a most perverse hypocrisy for
us to deny those huddled masses justice in our courts as a result of the
errors of defective counsel.  The law in the Eighth Circuit is on the
wrong side of justice and must be set right.
214. Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
215. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
216. Poet Emma Lazarus penned these words that now adorn the pedestal on which
the Statute of Liberty stands.  Her full poem reads as follows:
Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame, With conquering limbs astride from
land to land; Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand, A mighty wo-
man with a torch, whose flame, Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name,
Mother of Exiles.  From her beacon-hand, Glows world-wide welcome; her mild
eyes command, The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame.  “Keep ancient
lands, your storied pomp!” cries she, With silent lips.  “Give me your tired, your
poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The wretched refuse of
your teeming shore.  Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my
lamp beside the golden door!”
